When Georgia goes to the polls in a few days, the world will watch. Politically, Georgia is highly polarised, with urban and rural areas cancelling each other out and bringing it to a nearly 50-50 situation. Minority and youth turnout could be a decisive factor. Will Georgia flip, or will it stay blue?
We’re speaking of the country of Georgia, of course, which will head to the polls on 26 October to determine the composition of the next Parliament. The incumbent ‘blue’ party in this case is the Georgian Dream (GD~S&D), which has been governing the country for 12 years now and hopes to win a record-breaking fourth term in office.
GD, once a catch-all alliance encompassing liberals, centre-left, greens and national-conservatives, has taken a right-wing turn in recent years, which led to its eventual departure from the centre-left Party of European Socialists (PES-S&D) in 2023. Only a few weeks ago, GD and its ally—the national-conservative People’s Power (PP~ ECR), with which GD runs jointly in this election—voted in favour of legislation targeting the LGBT community.
Last year, GD introduced a controversial bill on the registration of so-called ‘organisations under foreign influence’, often dubbed as ‘Foreign Agent Law’ or ‘Russian Law’, due to its similarity to a law passed in Russia that was used to crack down on dissent. Critics see it as an attack on the country’s vibrant civil society sector, and its introduction and subsequent passing sparked massive protests, leading to its initial withdrawal. GD reintroduced the legislation earlier this year. The ensuing demonstrations were described as ‘the largest in modern Georgian history’, but the law was passed nonetheless and took effect in September.
GD still promises that Georgia will join the European Union by 2030—EU accession is supported by more than 80% of Georgians. But as the government’s rhetoric and actions have become increasingly divisive—ranging from accusing Western leaders of being part of a war-mongering conspiracy, to pledging to outlaw opposition parties and impeaching the President—the accession process has essentially been frozen.
The opposition hopes to capitalise on the public’s pro-EU sentiment and frustration about the Foreign Agent Law. While virtually all polls keep seeing GD in first place, its support in the Europe Elects polling average has declined from 48% in March 2023 (when the Foreign Agent Law was initially proposed, but then dropped after the ensuing demonstrations, before being reintroduced this year) to 38% now. As the 150 MPs of the Georgian parliament will be elected by a fully proportional system this election, GD is in danger of losing its absolute majority.
Out of the previously fragmented opposition camp, four major blocs have emerged:
- The centre-right Unity (EPP|RE) alliance, dominated by the United National Movement (UNM-EPP), the party of the controversial ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili, and its allies;
- The liberal Coalition for Change (CfC-RE), composed of the centrist Ahali (*)—a UNM split-off—and three other liberal parties (RE);
- The Strong Georgia (SG-RE) alliance, uniting liberal Lelo (RE), centre-left For the People (FP⇒S&D), centre-left Citizens (C~NI) and the civil society movement Freedom Square (*);
- Centrist For Georgia (ForGeo~ EPP), the party of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, who left GD in 2021.
All of the four alliances currently poll above the threshold of five percent and would jointly be able to form a government if the polls are right. Polling data in Georgia is sparse, and survey results for past elections have ranged from being relatively close to the eventual result to being completely off.
In order to overcome difficulties in a government formation—besides ideological differences, especially animosities between party leaders—Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili (*) has proposed the Georgian Charter, which was signed by all opposition parties. The Charter is a loose framework agreement encompassing numerous reforms in order to restore Georgia’s relations with the EU and tackle the influence of billionaire and GD party founder Bidzina Ivanishvili. The government would be technocratic and filled with non-partisan experts, which would pave the way for snap elections once the necessary reforms have been carried out.
Libertarian Girchi (~NI) and the national-conservative Alliance of Patriots (AP~ ECR), both potential allies for GD in the next parliamentary term, are currently polling below 5%, just as the centre-left Labour Party (LP-*).
In a country as polarised as Georgia, mobilisation will be the key factor in this election. Georgia’s past elections have followed a rough urban-rural division, which doesn’t align according to traditional political camps but rather along a pro- and anti-incumbency axis. Rural areas, especially those inhabited by ethnic minorities (mostly Armenians and Azeris), lean heavily in favour of the respective incumbent government, while the capital Tbilisi and larger cities tend to favour the opposition. GD’s win in 2020 can be attributed to running roughly tied with the opposition in the cities, while sweeping the regions by double-digit leads:
Georgian voting behaviour in the 2020 parliamentary election by type of constituency. Girchi has since undergone a split, with some of its former members now running for CfC (RE), which is part of the opposition camp.
The government’s strength in the rural areas stems from various sources. GD as the current party in charge has a deeply entrenched party infrastructure in the regions, which most opposition parties, especially the recently founded ones, lack (UNM is the notable exception). The smaller the settlement, the higher is the share of voters employed in the public sector—and they are actively being pressured to cast their votes for the ruling party. Voter intimidation of state employees has a long tradition in Georgian politics and was also observed under predecessor governments. On top, local strongmen with respective connections serve as another way to sway votes in the government’s favour: Previously, they became constituency MPs (which were abolished for this election), now they run as ‘regional delegates’ on the GD party list.
The only data point for sub-national voting intention is an ISSA opinion poll conducted in July before the final configuration of multiparty alliances was settled. It saw the support for GD and PP in Tbilisi drop to mere 30% (excluding the undecided), while the combined vote share of the opposition parties that eventually pledged to follow the Georgian Charter increased to 60%.
The opposition also places its hopes in the Georgian diaspora, which constituted about two per cent of enrolled voters in the 2020 election, but only 12,000 (0.6%) of the 1.9 million valid votes cast. This time, registration of voters abroad has increased by about 30,000 to 95,000 (out of 3.5 million). GD has faced accusations of trying to suppress the opposition-leaning expat vote, as only 67 polling stations were opened across the whole world, without the possibility of postal voting.
The other major divide is age. The younger generation was the driving force behind the protests against the Foreign Agent Law—this is also reflected in a recent survey by Edison Research (commissioned by Formula TV), according to which GD’s support among the youngest voters is in the mere teens, while close to an absolute majority among the elderly.
Edison Research poll by age group. Parties are not ordered on a classical left-right spectrum, but how close a cooperation with either GD (left) or UNM (right) is feasible.
136,000 young Georgians are eligible to vote for the first time, and an overwhelming majority of them reject the path the government has taken. Many of them participated in a pro-EU rally on Sunday before the election. But will they really show up at the polls?
Overall, the opposition has realistic chances to ‘flip’ Georgia, thanks to an enthusiastic youth, but GD’s strength in the regions (partially due to voter intimidation tactics) and its massive resources make it hard to predict a definite favourite.
Saturday’s election in Georgia will thus be a battle of turnout, which will be published over the course of the election day. High turnout in the cities should indicate a good evening for the opposition, while high rural turnout would likely make GD more optimistic about its chances. Exit polls will be published right after poll closing, and results should be known shortly thereafter.
Until then, both Georgias that vote this autumn remain toss-ups for the time being.
Europe Elects follows the election and the developments on our social media.
