Dutch politics continues to suffer from political impasses, short governments, and frequent elections. What happened to the “poldermodel”?
With the national parliament elections on 29 October 2025, Dutch voters will return to the polls for the third time in five years. Today, governments almost collapse faster than they form, and compromises reached after a year unravel in months. The country’s electoral crisis has its roots in the collapse of the Dutch centre-right, but all political factions have played a role in the chain of events that has transformed a country once defined by pragmatic coalition politics into one of Europe’s most unstable democracies.
From Rutte’s Scandals to Schoof’s Collapse
The pattern of collapse began in January 2021 when the third cabinet of Mark Rutte’s liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD-RE) resigned over a major childcare benefits scandal, which revealed that for years, tens of thousands of families had been wrongly accused of welfare fraud, with many driven into debt or eviction. The scandal shattered the illusion of Dutch administrative competence and propelled the MP who exposed it, Pieter Omtzigt, of the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDA-EPP), to national prominence.
Yet just two months later, Rutte’s VVD won re-election, thanks to the COVID-era rally-around-the-flag effect. However, any apparent goodwill would evaporate during coalition talks. When leaked documents subsequently showed that Rutte had discussed giving Omtzigt a “function elsewhere” – a thinly veiled attempt to sideline him, a no-confidence motion against Rutte was put forward. The proposal narrowly failed, but trust among coalition partners collapsed. When the CDA saved Rutte, Omtzigt quit and founded his own party, the centre-right New Social Contract (NSC-EPP).
After 299 days of negotiations, a fourth Rutte cabinet was formed. Comprised of the same parties as before – VVD (RE), liberal Democrats 66 (D66-RE), CDA, and the centre-right Christian Union (CU-EPP) – the existing bitterness remained unresolved. Environmental policy, particularly regarding nitrogen emission cuts targeting farmers, became a recurring point of tension within the government. The coalition limped on until July 2023, when the VVD demanded new restrictions on refugee family reunification. When D66 and CU refused, the government fell.
The Structural Crisis of the Centre-Right
Rutte announced his departure from Dutch politics soon after. He was succeeded as VVD leader by Dilan Yeşilgöz, who promised a “fresh start” by moving the party to the right. To that end, Yeşilgöz reversed Rutte’s previous veto against working with Geert Wilders’ right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV-PfE).
After PVV’s electoral victory in 2023, where it finished first with a quarter of the vote, the VVD agreed to form a government with Wilders’ party, Omtzigt’s NSC, and the agrarian Farmer–Citizen Movement (BBB-EPP), led by technocratic Prime Minister Dick Schoof (*). Yet this experiment would barely last eleven months before becoming the twenty-second Dutch government since World War II to collapse before completing its term.
The Schoof cabinet was chaotic from the beginning. Just two days into its term, the coalition was enveloped by a crisis concerning anti-hijab remarks tweeted by former Deputy PM Agema (PVV-PfE) while the prime minister was pledging respect for Muslim women in parliament. In August 2024, the government nearly collapsed when the NSC demanded an increase in low-income social spending. Likewise, Wilders repeatedly threatened to manufacture other crises. He demanded a state of emergency on asylum so parliament could be bypassed, attacked NSC ministers, and issued ultimatums on migration policy. In June 2025, he pulled the plug altogether, withdrawing PVV’s support and thus triggering yet another election.
Beneath all this chaos lies the long-term structural decline of the Dutch centre-right. For much of the post-war period, the VVD and CDA (and their predecessors) commanded over 50 percent of the vote. Together, they served as the backbone of every single government in Dutch contemporary history. That era is now over.
Today, the two centre-right parties poll around 24 percent. This decline explains the instability more than any scandal or personality clash.
The VVD and CDA now face an existential crisis with no clear way out. If the parties move right, they alienate moderates, while if they move to the centre, they lose conservatives. Every attempt to bridge the divide has failed.
Three times since 2000, the centre-right has attempted to govern with the populist right. And three times it has ended in chaos and early elections: the first Balkenende government in 2002, the first Rutte government in 2010-2012 and the Schoof government in 2024-2025.
Yet governing with the left is no easier. Conservative voters bolt to PVV or JA21 when the VVD or CDA cooperate with the green centre-left alliance GreenLeft—Labour Party(GL/PvdA-Greens/EFA|S&D)or D66. The result is paralysis: the centre-right cannot govern without betraying half its voters. And this will likely only get worse as it seems that no matter what kind of coalition this election produces, the centre-right parties will be smaller than their respective more left-leaning or right-leaning partners.
A System Losing Its Glue
For decades, Dutch politics was built on the poldermodel: a consensus-driven system in which diverse parties compromised for the common good. However, that model depended on strong, pragmatic centre-right leadership to hold the system together. Today, the populist right-wing parties dominate the right; the left is stagnant; and the once-dominant centre-right is weak and indecisive.
Of the past 10 coalitions that have governed the Netherlands since the start of the century, only one completed its full term. Each new coalition forms with the promise of renewal, only to end with the same diagnosis: too much fragmentation and too little trust.
When the Dutch vote again this month, they will be choosing among familiar faces and recycled slogans – “stability”, “fresh start”, “respectful politics”. But behind these words lies a deeper malaise: a country where every governing formula has been tried, and none seem to work.
The Political Landscape: Fragmented and Fatigued
PVV: Still the Largest
While down from its 2023 surge, Geert Wilders’ right-wing PVV remains the largest force in the polls, with around 21 percent. Immigration remains decisive for 35–40 percent of voters, half of whom see PVV as the only party offering serious answers. Wilders benefits from being the right’s clearest voice and from the distrust right-wing voters have for the VVD and CDA. Furthermore, despite most parties, including former coalition partner VVD, ruling out cooperation with the PVV, many voters still believe that a decisive win for the party will force mainstream parties back to the table.
Wilders’ campaign, however, has been interrupted by security threats. After a foiled plot targeting him and the Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever (N VA-ECR), Wilders has suspended public appearances. Whether this garners sympathy or hurts his visibility remains to be seen.
GL/PvdA: Stuck in the Middle of the Left
On the other side, the GL—PvdA is polling around 15 percent — roughly the same as two years ago. The merger of its constituent halves — the GreenLeft and the centre-left Labour Party — has been drawn out and messy, and the final stage of the merger is only due to be completed in mid-2026. After the party adopted a stronger pro-Palestinian stance, it has also alienated some more pro-Israel members..
Frans Timmermans, a former European commissioner leading the alliance, remains deeply polarising. Respected for his experience, but disliked for embodying the old political elite, Timmermans’ popularity rating hovers around 4.5 out of 10. While there is a chance that the party benefits from last-minute strategic voting by smaller progressive parties, this would be despite Timmermans, not because of him.
Still, the merger matters: without it, both parties would have been smaller, and left-wing voices would have risked marginalisation in media coverage that usually features only the largest few parties.
CDA: A Revival, But With Shallow Roots
If any party has momentum, it’s the CDA. After their 2023 low of just 3 percent, the Christian Democrats have rebounded to around 15 percent under Henri Bontenbal. With a 6.5/10 popularity rating, the highest among party leaders, Bontenbal is untainted by the chaos of past cabinets. Rather new on the political scene, he has presented the CDA as the calm, respectful, pragmatic, and unifying centre.
Yet this revival is fragile. The CDA lacks clear ownership of any issue and faces attacks from both sides. The right warns that Bontenbal would form a centrist government with GL/PvdA and D66 while the left says the party hasn’t changed and will revert to austerity. CDA’s base remains relatively old, as it has failed to break through among younger voters. The party’s revival may be more temporary than structural.
VVD: From Dominance to Disarray
The liberal and centre-right VVD (RE), long the dominant party of Dutch politics, is polling at historic lows, with the post-Rutte era exposing how much of the party’s authority was personally linked to Rutte. After 15 years in government, 13 under Rutte, the party has exhausted its credibility.
Its traditionally conservative base became disillusioned by Rutte forming coalitions with parties on the left and centre. When Rutte’s successor, Dilan Yeşilgöz, tried to stem the bleeding by tacking right, embracing stricter migration policies, governing with Wilders’ PVV, and even supporting a motion to classify “Antifa” as a terrorist organisation, the move prompted backlash. Centrist voters fled to CDA and D66, while conservatives weren’t assuaged.
Today, the VVD finds itself squeezed between two camps. It insists it will not govern with PVV again, but also “cannot imagine” governing with GL/PvdA. This leaves the party isolated.
The Others: D66, JA21, and the Squeeze
Meanwhile, D66 and JA21 are the only minor parties gaining ground to roughly 12 per cent in latest polls. D66 leader Rob Jetten is modestly popular (5.2/10) and has pitched his party as a centrist alternative to polarisation. Seeking to lure disillusioned VVD voters, the party has moved slightly right on migration and adopted patriotic themes. Jetten’s relative popularity compared to GL/PvdA’s Timmermans might also attract new voters from other left-leaning parties.
JA21, instead, is appealing to right-leaning voters disillusioned with VVD’s compromises under Rutte. They are anti-migration and fiscally conservative, but promise “responsible” participation in government — unlike PVV, which repeatedly collapses coalitions.
Smaller parties, however, are likely to struggle. As Dutch elections approach, the media focus narrows to the top five or six parties. Strategic voting and squeezed airtime often push smaller parties out of the conversation.
Governing Arithmetic: A Puzzle With No Solution
Every plausible coalition now faces a wall of mutual vetoes.
A centrist government of GL/PvdA, CDA, VVD, and D66 might have worked a decade ago, but today, a more right-wing VVD would find such a deal ideologically very difficult to handle. Such a coalition might even be impossible if VVD loses too much terrain.
A left-leaning minority coalition of GL/PvdA, CDA, and D66 could scrape a majority with support from left-wing Socialist Party (SP~LEFT), Euro-federalist Volt (Greens/EFA) or the CU. However, such an arrangement would be incredibly brittle due to the large number of necessary parties and the CDA’s more right-leaning base.
A centre-right coalition of CDA, VVD, D66, JA21 and the CU would be the preference for both the CDA and the VVD. This grouping resembles the third and fourth Rutte coalition governments, with the addition of the national-conservative JA21. However, this right-leaning coalition option lacks a majority in the polls, and it would put D66 in a vulnerable position, as its electorate leans to the left rather than the right.
In contrast, a right-wing coalition of PVV, VVD, BBB, JA21, and the CDA would have numbers but no trust. VVD fears repeating the chaotic 2024–25 Schoof experiment and has thus ruled out a government with the PVV. The CDA would also be unlikely to cooperate with the PVV as the resurrected Christian Democrats refuse to repeat the trauma of their participation in the first Rutte government (2010-2012), which relied on Wilders’ PVV and worsened their previous demise.
The increasingly likely scenario, many insiders fear, is months of failed negotiations followed by yet another snap election next year.
