Sweden’s national parliament election on 13 September has become a referendum with two uncertain options: a government in which the national-conservative Sweden Democrats (SD-ECR) for the first time control key ministries, or an unstable government led by the centre-left Social Democrats (S-S&D) whose four-party opposition bloc solely agrees on keeping the SD out of power.
Whether the Sweden Democrats should hold power and how much has dominated and transformed Swedish politics over the past decade: it has moved the political landscape away from a traditional left-right cleavage and changed the composition of political alliances.
The incumbent centre-right Moderates (M-EPP)-led minority government won the 2022 election by just 0.6 percentage points. To legislate, M along with the Christian Democrats (KD-EPP) and Liberals (L-RE) relied on the SD’s external support. This quickly turned into a persistent polling disadvantage: urban and female voters who had previously supported the Moderates and Liberals moved towards the Social Democrats, disillusioned with the Sweden Democrats’ unofficial king-making position.
Meanwhile, the opposition — made up of the Social Democrats (S-S&D), Left Party (V-LEFT), Greens (MP-G/EFA) and the liberal Centre Party (C-RE) — have held a remarkably durable lead over the past four years. Today they sit at roughly 52 percent of the vote compared to the right-leaning coalition’s 45 percent. Yet while Magdalena Andersson of the Social Democrats may well return as prime minister, political instability is looming as the four opposition parties barely agree on how to form a government if they indeed get a majority.
To SD or not to SD
The right’s 2022 victory was narrow. M, KD, and L formed a minority government with external SD support. In the years since, the SD’s influence has only grown as it flexed its position as Sweden’s second-largest party. Meanwhile, the Liberals and Moderates have faced an electoral squeeze in the polls. Much of the Liberals’ traditional urban and female electorate – which dislike the Sweden Democrats – has moved left, putting the party well below the 4 percent threshold to win seats in parliament; the Moderates have lost urban and female voters as well.
The Sweden Democrats’ growing influence and the government’s deportation policies also appear to be controversial among large parts of the electorate. As stories of young adults who grew up in Sweden being deported made headlines this spring, the gap in favour of the opposition S, V, MP and C parties widened. The Moderates and Liberals have refused to change course and further cosied up to the Sweden Democrats. In return for the SD’s leader Jimmie Åkesson renouncing any claims to the premiership, the Moderates’ Kristersson has promised the party to fully enter government with ministers – an upgrade from the current status as a support party. Such an arrangement would make SD the largest party in government.
The deal is an accurate reflection of the reality that there is no way for the right to govern without the SD. Hence, M and L are banking on turning their weakness into a strength by fully embracing the SD: they hope to show voters an image of stability and unity in contrast with the opposition parties that only agree on keeping the Sweden Democrats out of power but differ on issues like the economy, crime, and how to form government in the first place. So far, this strategy has not worked, and the polling gap has continued to grow in the opposition’s favour, underlining SD’s decisiveness in determining voter preferences.
Andersson’s post-election headaches
For their part, the Social Democrats’ fundamental weakness is what happens after election day as the party struggles to explain what a new Andersson government would look like. The Left Party wants major left-wing reforms, including restrictions on privatisation, stronger workers’ rights, and wealth taxation; the Centre Party wants to defend privatisation, cut taxes, and liberalise the labour market further; the Greens have their own priorities, particularly around climate policy. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats remain deliberately vague on their own plans and how they would manage the other parties’ contradictory demands.
For those who remember Swedish politics when Social Democrats was last in power, this sounds like a déjà vu. Between 2014 and 2022, there were up to four S-led minority governments based on fragile agreements. Former Prime Minister Stefan Löfven governed with the Greens, first with support from the Left Party, and later on in 2019 with support from the Centre Party and Liberals. Both arrangements were aimed at keeping the SD out of power, but also struggled to hold a majority in parliament. Consequently, these governments failed to pass many of their policies and three budgets were defeated. In 2021, the cooperation with C and L broke apart over the liberal parties demands for the liberalisation of the housing market. V opposed this and supported a no-confidence vote, bringing down the S-led government after which L u-turned and rejoined the right by finally opening the door to SD.
Then came Andersson. On 24 November 2021, she succeeded Löfven as Sweden’s first female prime minister. Seven hours later, she resigned. Andersson returned days later leading a fragile single-party Social Democratic minority government, still dependent on the contradictory demands of V, MP and C. Four years later, none of the difficulties Andersson faced to form a government have been resolved.
Today, the Left Party’s distrust towards S has only grown. This election cycle, it is demanding to be fully part of an Andersson government with ministerial positions. In contrast, the Centre Party – while not ruling out informal cooperation – fully rejects this and will not allow V to get ministers in a new Andersson government. Instead, C hopes to write history and form some sort of centrist government with both the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats.
KD has openly expressed frustration with M on issues such as construction, healthcare and energy; This has energised rumours that KD potentially work with S and C and could offer a way to Andersson around the seemingly impossible V-C combination. However, it remains unlikely. Despite its disagreements with the Moderates, KD is still campaigning for continued cooperation with the other Tidö parties. And the cultural and ideological distance between S and KD remains substantial, especially as such a cooperation would also need the Greens to reach a majority.
As the uncertainty around what a new S-led government might look like continues, voters seem to be moving around again. V, C and MP are all gaining at the Social Democrats’ expense, likely for tactical reasons: voters may be opting for these three smaller parties to influence what Andersson does if she becomes prime minister. Meanwhile, the Moderates are also hoping to win over voters from S scared away by the prospect of political instability. The polls have tightened again in the past few weeks and such considerations may be more decisive than the fear of SD’s power.
A new challenger to the right of SD
Despite the Sweden Democrats being at the centre of the political limelight, the party is also struggling with its own issues as the party increasingly finds itself in an inconsistent position. SD-leader Jimmie Åkesson wants the SD to demonstrate that it is ready to take full responsibility for government, but other parts of the party continue to push for a more radical path, stepping up anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric. At the same time, Åkesson’s decision to renounce his intention to become prime minister in favour of Kristersson has made him less relevant in the campaign than he used to be.
This has created space for a new and more radical challenger: the Örebro Party (ÖP-*). ÖP is a local party in the central Swedish region of Örebro, founded by Markus Allard. The party presents itself as a populist alternative – proposing mass deportations, the introduction of forced labour camps to fight crime and putting the judiciary under political control – and accuses SD for becoming part of the establishment that it once opposed.
The Swedish electoral law has two types of thresholds. To win seats in parliament, a party either surpasses four percent nationally or 12 percent in a region. Current regional polling in Örebro puts ÖP at around 15 percent. If Allard replicates this on 13 September, he will win a seat – the first time SD is faced with a more radical alternative next to it in parliament.
Wild cards to keep an eye on
Besides ÖP, two other wildcards in this election are the Liberals’ ability to reach the four-percent threshold and turnout among voters with immigrant backgrounds.
The Liberals are fighting to clear the threshold and this could be crucial for the entire right-wing bloc. Due to years of infighting on whether to work with the Sweden Democrats, the party has been parked far below the threshold. But if L manages to grow closer to the three percent cut-off, tactical voting by Moderate and Sweden Democrat voters could make the difference. Without the Liberals in parliament, there is no path for the right to reach a majority. And that could motivate right-wing voters to lend their ballot to L this time.
Another potentially important factor is turnout. Early voting appears particularly strong in areas with large populations of people with immigrant backgrounds. If this reflects a broader mobilisation of voters who want to remove Tidö – and especially SD – from power, it could matter significantly. In the previous election, turnout fell to record lows among this group of people, partially granting the right its narrow majority. And as pollsters tend to struggle reaching these voters, the question arises whether polls can capture this development.
