Despite weeks of upheaval and a proposed new ruling coalition, Lithuania and its new prime minister, Inga Ruginienė (LSDP-S&D), still remain politically paralysed.
This is a critical time for the NATO country bordering Russia, as it seeks to balance defence issues with concerns about inflation, the cost of living, and migration rates.
Plunged into uncertainty by the resignation of its previous government, the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP-S&D) had hoped that a new coalition would allow it to stay in office until the country’s 2028 parliamentary elections. To that end, Ruginienė’s LSDP invited the conservative Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVŽS-ECR), conservative Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance (LLRA KŠS-ECR), two independents, and the right-wing Dawn of Nemunas (NA~S&D) to form a government.
However, the sheer ideological diversity and number of parties in this new cabinet have made the actual formation process incredibly difficult, as disagreements between the country’s president and NA have threatened to sink the coalition before it even takes office.
And even if that obstacle is overcome, by almost ensuring that the LSDP will struggle to meet its policy promises, the coalition will deeply hurt the party’s long-term electoral prospects.
The previous coalition: doomed to fail
Following the 27 October 2024 Lithuanian Parliamentary Elections, the LSDP emerged with a 52-seat plurality in the 141-seat Seimas. The party then entered into cooperation with the Union of Democrats “For Lithuania” (DSVL-Greens/EFA), which had won 14 seats.
Although both parties had explicitly ruled out working with them, the populist, antisemitic, and Russo-philic Dawn of Nemunas (NA~S&D) also joined the coalition. The inclusion of NA brought the coalition to 86 seats, which the LSDP believed would afford its government enough wiggle room to navigate the parties’ diverging views on the Russia-Ukraine War, civil unions, and fiscal policy.
From the outset, however, a fourth party played a crucial role in the government’s composition. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda (*) had vowed to veto any NA cabinet nominee and explicitly cautioned against giving a cabinet seat to NA leader Remigijus Žemaitaitis, whom the Constitutional Court ruled had violated the constitution.
To overcome Nausėda’s opposition, NA made several concessions, including nominating ostensibly non-partisan professionals to the party’s designated cabinet positions.
However, the Paluckas (LSDP-S&D) Cabinet lasted only until this summer. In July 2025, news organisations reported on a string of scandals and investigations involving Paluckas, ranging from late fine payments to shady family business dealings. Under pressure from Nausėda, coalition partners, and mass protests, Paluckas stepped down.
The new coalition
Following Paluckas’ resignation, DSVL leaders refused to join another coalition with NA. LSDP could not mathematically form a coalition with just DSVL, and thus replaced DSVL with the conservative Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVŽS-ECR), conservative Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance (LLRA KŠS-ECR), and two independents.
Why does this coalition exist?
The new coalition immediately faces significant internal discord.
On national security and foreign policy, LSDP and LVŽS have supported increases in defence funding and are staunchly pro-Western, while NA has opposed general increases, and LLRA KŠS (ECR) leaders have worn symbols associated with Putin’s Russia.
Economically, LSDP seeks to increase pensions, while NA advocates for lower taxes, and LVŽS believes that economic growth can be facilitated by “stronger families.” On social issues, the coalition is so divided that the LSDP has had to publicly agree not to expect any support from the LVŽS or LLRA KŠS on civil partnerships, same-sex partnerships, or abortion.
For LSDP, this coalition is a last-ditch effort to stay in power. Their only other option would be a snap election, which might wipe out their plurality. Early polling indicates that if elections were held today, the centre-right Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS LKD-EPP) would be competitive.
But by adopting a “whatever it takes” attitude to staying in government, the LSDP has made itself vulnerable to manipulation.
NA’s rise coincides with clashes with Nausėda
In the previous coalition, NA was the second-largest party by six seats. Now, that margin has increased to eleven. With this larger presence, Žemaitaitis has begun flexing his muscles.
Although Nausėda maintained that he would veto any nominees affiliated with NA, this time Žemaitaitis called his bluff. With its desire to stay in government, LSDP reluctantly obliged, nominating two NA members to key cabinet positions.
When Nausėda delayed the approval of the nominees, Žemaitaitis stated that “If the two candidates that have now been submitted are not approved, then in that case the ruling majority de facto no longer exists.”
Reports then indicated that Nausėda might be willing to accept one nominee if the second nomination was not affiliated with NA.
In an effort to break the stalemate, the LSDP and NA agreed in late September to swap cabinet portfolios, with NA exchanging the Energy Ministry for the Ministry of Culture. However, even this move has come with controversy. As soon as NA confirmed the swap, Žemaitaitis nominated a (albeit distant) family member of his for the position.
Ruginienė quickly approved this nomination, and it now sits on Nausėda’s desk
By siding with NA in this stalemate, LSDP has effectively soured relations with Nausėda while planting the seed for more extreme quid pro quos by Žemaitaitis in the future. LSDP may regret publicly fighting with Nausėda, who has an approval rating of 64%
New Leadership
Former Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas (LSDP-S&D) had a working history with Žemaitaitis, which partially explains why the latter did not push for more in the Paluckas cabinet. Both met often in late 2024 to discuss policy and areas of overlap. Paluckas has also publicly defended Žemaitaitis, including advocating for his membership in the Seimas’ delegation to NATO amidst controversies. When discussing the coalition with NA and DSVL, Paluckas remarked that he had “love” for both party leaders.
But new Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė (LSDP-S&D), who joined the LSDP in 2024 and entered the Seimas that year, cannot rely on that personal connection. And while her background in economic policy will enable her to work closely with the LSDP’s finance and social security ministries, her limited political experience in other areas will make wrangling her diverse and often hostile coalition partners a challenge.
Long-lasting implications for LSDP
LSDP wants to stay in power — at least until the next scheduled parliamentary election — but it will face negative consequences for its attempts to do so. The new coalition will struggle to pass legislation, Žemaitaitis and his populist NA will continue to gain power and influence political discourse, and Prime Minister Ruginienė will neither be able to keep Žemaitaitis in check nor navigate turbulent coalition dynamics. As NA rises and LSDP flags, the coalition will continue to be at odds with a popular President Nausėda.
As recent polling indicates, Lithuanians will ultimately place the blame squarely on LSDP, the party which sold itself out for power, and will express their discontent in 2028 and onwards.
